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By focusing on the Italian experience, we ask whether the relationship be-
tween labor taxes and unemployment varies across regions. In spite of similar
national labor market institutions, we show that this relationship is signiﬁ-
cantly stronger in the highly industrialized North than in the less developed
South, where unemployment is much higher. An important source of varia-
tion in the regional responsiveness of unemployment originates from the fact
that regional gross wages in the North increase more than in the South in
response to a hike in labor taxes.
• JEL: J51, H20
• Keywords: regional unemployment, labor taxes1 Introduction
A popular explanation of the observed diﬀerences in the behavior of the rate
of unemployment across European countries focuses on the interaction of
negative shocks with national institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
These institutions include employment protection measures, the unemploy-
ment beneﬁts system and the degree of centralization of the wage bargain.
In a recent example of this approach, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) show that
the impact of labor taxes on the rate of unemployment depends on the na-
tional institutions regulating wage bargaining. In particular, they argue that
the impact of higher labor taxes is lower in countries where bargaining is ei-
ther decentralized (Anglo-Saxon countries) or very centralized (Scandinavian
countries). Most continental European countries have wage setting institu-
tions that lie between these two extremes: in these countries the negative
impact of an increase of labor taxes on unemployment is highest.
In this literature, the empirical evidence is based on comparisons of ag-
gregate data across countries. Moreover, labor market institutions have a
national dimension. A key feature of unemployment in some continental Eu-
ropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s – most notably Italy and Spain,
but also Germany – however, has been the high dispersion of regional unem-
ployment rates (see Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998, for Spain and Brunello, Lupi
and Ordine, 2001, for Italy). The fact that average unemployment and the
dispersion of regional unemployment rates have both increased suggests that
there can be important within—country diﬀerences in the interaction between
shocks and institutions that are overlooked by the conventional approach that
focuses only on national data.
In this paper we study the long run relationship between regional unem-
ployment and regional labor taxes and ask whether this relationship varies
signiﬁcantly across groups of regions. Our empirical study focuses on the Ital-
ian experience. We believe that Italy, with its high regional unemployment
dispersion and rising labor taxes, provides an interesting case study.
In spite of similar national labor market institutions, we ﬁnd that the
relationship between unemployment and labor taxes in Italy is signiﬁcantly
1stronger in the highly industrialized North than in the less developed South.
A key source of variation in the regional responsiveness of unemployment
to changes in labor taxes is that regional gross wages in the North increase
more than in the South in response to a hike in labor taxes. We explain
part of the higher sensitivity of gross wages in the North with composition
eﬀects (between industrial sectors) and argue that the residual part can be
accounted by regional diﬀerences in the relative importance of the wage drift.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple
two—equation model that describes the equilibrium relationship between la-
bor taxes and unemployment and provides a guide for the empirical analysis.
In section 3 we introduce the data. The next two sections are devoted to
the empirical evidence on the relationship between labor taxes and regional
unemployment and between labor taxes and regional gross wages. Section
5 explores how regional institutions can help explaining our results. Con-
clusions and policy implications follow. Three appendices complement the
paper. The ﬁrst is a technical appendix that discusses in some detail the the-
oretical links between taxes and regional wage determination. Appendices
B and C deal with data sources and the estimation of the labor tax wedge,
respectively.
2T h e M o d e l
Following the approach popularized by Layard et al. (1991), we characterize
the long run evolution of regional labor markets with a pair of equations, a
regional (pseudo) labor demand and a regional wage setting equation. We
ignore labor mobility between regions, which has been very limited since
the early 1970s.1 The general theoretical model is illustrated in detail in
Appendix A. Here we adopt the simplifying assumption that the elasticity
of substitution in the production function is equal to unity (Cobb Douglas).
Real regional value added is assumed to depend on regional labor and on the
1The out-migration rate from the South which characterized the 1960s fell substantially
in the early 1970s and remained low during the 1980s and the 1990s: see Brunello, Lupi
and Ordine (2001) and the references therein.
2real price of energy (see Bruno, 1984). Firms operating in monopolistically
competitive markets set employment and prices by taking factor prices as
given and by maximizing proﬁts. This is equivalent to equating the product
of the real product wage by the price markup to the marginal product of
labor. Let the price markup be a function of the real interest rate, as in
Phelps (1994). Using small letters for logs, employment is deﬁned by
eit = α0 − α1pmt − α2Rit − α3(w − p)it (1)
where i is for the region and t for time, e is employment, p is prices, w is
wages gross of taxes, R is the real rate of interest and pm is the real price of
energy.
In unionized labor markets, wages are set by bargaining between unions
and employers. Unions care about wage gains over the expected alternative
income and ﬁrms care about proﬁts.2 Bargaining can occur both at the
sectorial and at the local level. A typical outcome of the bargain is that gross
wages increase with the alternative option (w) and with labor productivity
(y − e) and decrease with the rate of unemployment (U) (see Booth, 1995).
A higher labor tax wedge increases gross real wages if there is real wage
resistance and unions are able to shift part or all of the tax burden away
from real net wages (see Pissarides, 1998, for a discussion).3 Assuming that
the alternative option is a function of the unemployment rate and of the
opportunity value of time ζ and using a log-linear form, regional gross wages
are given by4
(w − p)it = β0 − β1Uit + β2τLit + β3ζ + β4pmt + β5Rit (2)
where τL is the log tax wedge, measured as a share of the gross wage.5
2This is a standard assumption in the wage bargaining literature, see for example
Layard et al., 1991.
3In this paper we consider only average labor taxes. There is a small but increasing
literature on the relationship between tax progressivity, wages and unemployment. See
for instance Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), and Brunello and
Sonedda (2002).
4With a Cobb Douglas speciﬁcation the labor share is constant and output per head
in the wage setting equation can be eliminated.
5T h et a xw e d g ei sd e ﬁned as (see Appendix A for details) τ =

P (1 + t)

/[P (1 − φ)]
3If we normalize the regional labor force to unity, Uit =1−eit and regional
equilibrium unemployment is obtained by using (2) into (1), which yields
Uit = γ0 + γ1τLit + γ2pmt + γ3Rit + γ4ζit (3)





This simple model suggests that the equilibrium relationship between
regional unemployment and the regional tax wedge depends on three para-
meters: 1) the sensitivity of the real gross wage to changes in τL, β2;2 )
the sensitivity of the real gross wage to the unemployment rate, β1;3 )t h e
sensitivity of employment to the real gross wage, α3.
3T h e D a t a
The record on unemployment has diﬀered markedly among Italian regions
since the early 1970s. We plot in Figure 1 the average annual unemployment
rate in the Northern (N from now on) regions and in the less developed South
(S from now on) from 1965 to 1995.6 The data clearly show that regional
unemployment diﬀerentials have widened, especially since the mid 1980s (see
Brunello, Lupi and Ordine, 2001, for a detailed discussion).
D u r i n gt h es a m ep e r i o d ,t h ee v o l u t i o no ft h ea v e r a g el a b o rt a xw e d g e ,
measured as the ratio between estimated labor tax payments and the average
where P is the the price for a ﬁrm operating in a monopolistic environment, P is the
average price, t is the share of payroll taxes on gross wages, and φ is the share of income
taxes. Then ln(τ) = ln[(1 + t)/(1−φ) ]+l n ( P/P)=τL +l n ( P/P),w i t hτL denoting the
log labor tax wedge.
6We consider Piemonte, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia,
Liguria and Emilia Romagna among the northern regions, and Abruzzo, Molise, Campania,
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna among the southern ones. There are
only two minor diﬀerences with respect to the conventional classiﬁcation used e.g. by the
National Statistical Institute (ISTAT): we do not consider Valle d’Aosta within the set of
the northern regions because it is a tiny region with a special statute; we include Emilia
Romagna among the northern regions because its productive structure is very similar to
that of the northern area.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates by area.
gross wage, has also varied across regions (see Figure 2).7 In particular, the
payroll tax wedge after 1968 increased in the N regions and declined in the
South: by the early 1980s, the gap between the two wedges was close to 9
percentage points, at less than 0.25 in the South and at close to 0.34 in the
Nr e g i o n s .
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, the payroll tax wedge increased
more or less at the same pace in both areas, and the gap remained close
to 8 percentage points. As a result of these developments, the payroll tax
wedge increased from 0.323 to 0.381 in the N areas and declined during the
same period from 0.325 to 0.301 in the South. A broadly similar pattern
emerges when we consider the total tax wedge (Figure 3), that includes both
social security contributions paid by employees and labor income taxes. In
this case, the gap between the two macro regions in 1995 was higher than 7
percentage points.
The signiﬁcant gap in the regional labor tax wedge is explained by the
7We measure the labor tax wedge in the private sector τL as social security contributions
paid by employers and employees plus estimated income taxes paid by employees as a
percentage of the gross wage. Details on the construction of the regional labor tax wedge
are provided in Appendix C at the end of the paper.
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Figure 2: Payroll labor tax rates by area.
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Figure 3: Labor tax wedge by area.
6introduction of tax breaks targeted especially (albeit not exclusively) at the
Southern regions in the late 1960s, when net wages in these regions started
to increase after the abolition of regional diﬀerences in wage contracts (See
Faini, 1993 and Malfatti, 1994, for a detailed discussion of these measures).
The ﬁgures suggest that in the past thirty years the rate of unemploy-
ment and the labor tax wedge in Italy have exhibited signiﬁcant variation
both over time and across groups of regions. We exploit this variation to in-
vestigate whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the relationship between
unemployment and labor taxes in the two areas of the country.
Since the evidence in Figures 1 and 3 suggests that average labor taxes
have increased less in the regions where unemployment rates have increased
most (the South), one is tempted to draw from this the conclusion that higher
average labor taxes must have had a larger impact in the South than in the
North of the country. Such a conclusion is unwarranted for at least two
reasons: ﬁrst, a direct causal relationship from labor taxes to unemployment
needs to be established with the help of a theoretical model8; second, this
relationship must take into account the fact that other variables can aﬀect
the unemployment rate in the long run.
One important candidate is the opportunity value of time ζ. In this liter-
ature, it is standard to measure ζ with unemployment beneﬁts (see Layard
et al., 1991). An alternative option is to measure ζ with real per capita
income from social wealth, ζ (Fitoussi et al., 2000). The underlying idea is
that the higher this income, the lower the incentive to work and the higher
the wage that needs to be paid to attract workers from the unemployment
pool to employment. Fitoussi et al. deﬁne ζ as the real income from so-
cial assistance and social insurance, inclusive of unemployment beneﬁts. We
compute ζ as the ratio of total (regional) social government transfers to
the (regional) population. Social government transfers in our data include
unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance and pension income. The income
associated to these transfers provides opportunities for intra-household re-
8The theoretical model developed in Appendix A implies that this relationship depends
on wage setting behavior, and that unemployment is more closely related to the tax wedge
in those regions where the wage drift is more widespread, i.e. in the North of the country.
7distribution from the retired old to the unemployed young and contributes
to increasing the reservation wage attached to jobs.9
Since ζ is dominated by pension income, one can think of other channels
beside the reservation wage linking this variable to the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate. One such channel is wage bargaining. When union membership
is extended to pensioners, as it is in the case of Italy, and unions do not fully
internalize the pay as you go constraint linking pension payments to pay-
roll taxes, higher pension income is expected to reduce, ceteris paribus,t h e
real wage, thereby reducing equilibrium unemployment. The main reason is
that pensions can be considered as deferred compensation. We conclude that
income from social wealth can have both positive and negative supply side
eﬀects on unemployment: on the positive side, it increases the reservation
wage; on the negative side, it reduces current real wages by increasing future
expected real compensation.
Figure 4 plots ζ i nt h eN o r t ha n di nt h eS o u t ho ft h ec o u n t r y .T h ed a t a
show that real income from social wealth has increased rapidly in both areas,
but especially in the North, where the majority of pension recipients live.
4T h e E v i d e n c e
4.1 Labor Taxes and Unemployment
We have data on 15 regions (7 in the North and 8 in the South) for the period
1965-95 and start by estimating a dynamic version of (3) region by region.
The estimable model is an empirical dynamic analog of (3): using a stan-
dard notation we deﬁne
α(L)uit = c + xitβ(L)+νit (5)
where xit =( τLit,p mit,ζit,R it),u it is the log of the unemployment rate and
νit are residuals.
9Bentolila and Ichino (1998) discuss intra-household transfers in the context of South-
ern European unemployment. Manacorda and Moretti (2001) study how pension income
aﬀects the living arrangements of young Italians.
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Figure 4: Real social transfers per head
In order to gain eﬃciency, the model is reparameterized and estimated
as a (generalized) ECM (error correction mechanism). Lags are selected
for each region by restricting a fairly long lag structure while maintaining
”well-behaved” residuals. Since most of the variables in (5) are likely to
be non-stationary, we test for cointegration using a version of the Banerjee,
Dolado, and Mestre (BDM) test. We also compute exogeneity tests for the
contemporaneous right hand side regressors. The exogeneity tests are based
on the following procedure: the residuals of (pseudo) marginal models, spec-
iﬁed in the form of VARs, are introduced in the conditional models, and the
(joint) signiﬁcance of the parameter(s) of the residuals is tested. Exogeneity
is rejected when the parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Our results are summarized in Table 1. The ﬁndings are broadly consis-
tent with our previous work (see Brunello et al., 2000) and indicate that, on
average, the impact of the tax wedge in the N regions is more than double the
average impact in the S regions. Using labor force weights, the average long
run elasticity of unemployment to labor taxes is 3.897 (0.627) in the North
and 1.142 (0.077) in the South.10 The diﬀerence in the elasticities turns out
10Weighted standard errors within parentheses. We can retrieve the estimate of γ1 in
(4) by multiplying the estimated long run elasticity in each area by average unemployment
9to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
It is useful to compare these estimates to those obtained by Daveri and
Tabellini (2000), Table 9, page 75, who ﬁnd that in continental Europe the
coeﬃcient of labor taxes in the unemployment equation ranges between 0.29
and 0.54. Using the average values of unemployment and labor taxes by area,
our elasticities imply that the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.53 in the Northern re-
gions and 0.39 in the South, within the range found by Daveri and Tabellini.11
Compared to the ﬁndings in the literature (Nickell and Van Ours, 2000), these
elasticities are quite large. They suggest that a 10% reduction in the labor
tax wedge, given real income from social wealth, would reduce Northern equi-
librium unemployment by 38.9% and Southern equilibrium unemployment by
11.4%.12
We also ﬁnd that per capita real income from social wealth ζ has a nega-
tive inﬂuence on unemployment in the North and a positive inﬂuence in the
South. One explanation consistent with the simple model in the previous sec-
tion is that the reservation wage eﬀect prevails on the diﬀered compensation
eﬀect in the South. The contrary occurs in the North.
The price wedge pm appears to have been more important in the North,
a n dh a sh a das i g n i ﬁcant impact in the South only for Sardegna.13 Finally,
and only for three Northern regions, we ﬁnd a negative association between
the real rate of interest and regional unemployment. This result is, to some
extent, puzzling and might indicate that real interest rates are not that im-
portant in determining regional unemployment rates.
Turning to the evidence in favor of cointegration among the variables in
(5), results are more clear-cut for northern regions, where we ﬁnd always
in the area.
11In the North we have that ∂U
∂Υ =3 .8970.058
0.429 = .52687,w h e r eΥ is the level of the labor
tax wedge. In the South we obtain ∂U
∂Υ =1 .1420.129
0.375 = .39285.
12By equilibrium unemployment we mean the unemployment rate that would prevail in
a steady state, when all short term variations, including changes in the rate of inﬂation,
are set to zero.
13The regional variation of the real price of energy is essentially induced by the cross-
regional variability of the value added deﬂator. The observed asymmetry can help explain
the asymmetric behavior of regional unemployment from the 1980s onwards, when the real
price of energy dramatically declined from the peak reached during the Iranian revolution.
10Table 1: Static long-run parameters in regional regressions
Region τ pm ζ r UR Ex
Northern Regions
Piemonte 3.621 0.160 -0.710 -4.179∗
(SE) (1.048) (0.053) (0.417)
Lombardia 5.895 0.215 -1.712 -0.040 -4.895∗ 0.721
(SE) (1.677) (0.043) (0.594) (0.020)
Trentino A.A. 3.724 0.297 -1.486 -4.280∗ 0.300
(SE) (1.336) (0.073) (0.623)
Veneto 2.181 0.220 -0.682 -6.286∗∗ 0.546
(SE) (0.457) (0.023) (0.208)
Friuli V.G. 3.878 0.216 -0.992 -7.275∗∗ 0.187
(SE) (0.405) (0.021) (0.177)
Liguria 1.942 -0.040 -0.023 -0.032 -4.948∗ 0.925
(SE) (0.872) (0.027) (0.304) (0.017)
Emilia R. 2.529 0.151 -0.661 -0.024 -6.540∗∗
(SE) (0.503) (0.018) (0.177) (0.007)
Southern Regions
Abruzzo 0.626 0.394 0.011 -4.268∗
(SE) (0.302) (0.071) (0.006)






Basilicata 1.879 0.681 -2.632
(SE) (0.682) (0.154)
Calabria 1.779 0.836 -4.325∗ 0.790
(SE) (0.297) (0.081)
Sicilia 2.756 0.811 -4.431∗ 0.398
(SE) (0.210) (0.073)
Sardegna 2.290 0.195 0.693 -3.682 0.996
(SE) (0.564) (0.058) (0.200)
The parameters reported in this table correspond to the parameters of
the long run solutions of (5). ”UR” is the BDM test for cointegration:
one asterisk and two asterisks indicate 5% and 1% level of signiﬁcance,
respectively. ”EX” is the p-value of the test of exogeneity of the
contemporaneous regressors. The test is not computed when only
lagged variables enter (5). SE is the standard error. We could not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant long-run relationship for Campania and Puglia.
11cointegration. In southern regions results are mixed. There are two regions
(Campania and Puglia) for which we do not ﬁnd any long run relationship
among the selected variables; in other two instances (Molise and Basilicata)
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant long run relationship, but the p-values of the cointegra-
tion tests result close to 25%.14
A potential problem with these empirical estimates is that sample sizes
are small. We check the robustness of our ﬁndings as follows: ﬁrst, we pool
the available time series and cross section information into two groups, one
for the North and one for the South, and test for cointegration in panel data.
Second, we estimate for each group dynamic error correction models using
the method of generalized moments (GMM).
Our cointegration tests are applied to (5) and are based on the tech-
nique developed by Pedroni (1999). Pedroni’s tests apply to panel data and
consist of computing residuals—based statistics to test the null hypothesis of
no cointegration against the alternative of cointegrating (and heterogeneous)
vectors. The cointegration tests are originally seven, but we rely on those
with higher power in the speciﬁc context of our panels.15 In particular, we
use the panel variance, the panel ADF and the group ADF statistics, after
allowing two lags in the dynamic speciﬁcation. While the former two sta-
tistics pool across regions the autoregressive coeﬃcients of the residuals, the
latter test allows the autoregressive coeﬃcient to vary across regions under
the cointegration hypothesis, thereby adding an additional source of hetero-
geneity in the panel. Table 2 reports our results. When we do not include a
trend among the regressors, all the tests reject the null of no cointegration at
5% level. If an heterogeneous trend is included, panel and group ADF still
reject lack of cointegration between uit and xit.
The evidence in favor of cointegration in the two groups of regions is used
to estimate dynamic error correction models for each group. We start from
14Exogeneity tests cannot reject the null in all the regions.
15Pedroni (1997) simulates the level of signiﬁcance and power of the tests under several
scenarios. Given the fact that we have 31 years and 7 or 8 regions, we rely on the tests
which performed better in Pedroni’s simulations with 20 years and 20 panel observations.
12Table 2: Panel cointegration tests
Northern Regions
no trend heterogeneous trend
panel v-stat 1.976 0.295
panel ADF -1.818 -2.388
group ADF -1.742 -2.557
#r e g r e s s o r s 4
Nobs 217
Southern Regions
panel v-stat 2.014 2.439
panel ADF -3.053 -3.727
group ADF -3.181 -3.888
#r e g r e s s o r s 4
Nobs 248
Note: All statistics are one-tailed tests. Crit-
ical value at 5% level is 1.645 for panel v-stat
and -1.645 for the remaining tests.
the following dynamic panel speciﬁcation
∆uit = ai + ρ∆uit−1 + ∆xitδ + λ∆πit + ξ∆πit−1 + θ[uit−1 − xit−1β]+µit
(6)
where ∆π i st h ec h a n g ei nt h ei n ﬂation rate, that should capture important
short—term dynamics, as suggested by Layard et al. (1991), and simplify
sequentially the dynamic structure by eliminating the variables in ﬁrst dif-
ferences with an insigniﬁcant coeﬃc i e n t . I nt h ee s t i m a t e s ,w eh a n d l et h e
region speciﬁce ﬀect ai as a ﬁxed eﬀect, by introducing regional dummies.
Moreover, we treat ∆uit−1, ∆xit and ∆πit as endogenous and use the gen-
eralized methods of moments (GMM) estimator. The estimates of the ﬁnal
speciﬁcation are shown in Table 3.
The table conﬁrms that the long run elasticity of unemployment to labor
taxes is signiﬁcantly higher in the North than in the South (3.959 versus
0.963). The Wald test rejects at the 5% level of conﬁdence the null hypothesis
that the diﬀerence between these elasticities be equal to zero. Reassuringly,
these numbers are very similar to the average elasticities computed from
Table 1.
13Table 3: GMM estimates. Fixed eﬀects. Sample period: 1965-1995. Depen-
dent variable: ∆ uit
North South
∆π -1.607∗∗ (.492) -
∆πt−1 -4.015∗∗ (.660) -
∆τL -1 . 4 0 8 ∗∗(.266)
∆pm - -.223∗∗ (.048)
∆ζt−1 .539∗∗ (.187) -.495∗∗ (.139)
∆τL,t−1 - .916∗∗ (.217)
∆Rt−1 -.016∗∗ (.007) -
ut−1 -.382∗∗ (.050) -.284∗∗ (.055)
τLt−1 3.959∗∗ (1.097) .963 (.710)
ζt−1 -.677∗∗ (.291) .776∗∗ (.172)
pm,t−1 .127∗∗ (.054) -.217∗∗ (.077)
Rt−1 -.059∗∗ (.018) -.030∗ (.018)
Wald Test [.000]
Nobs 203 232
J test [.068] [.096]
R2 0.39 0.29
Note: robust standard errors within parentheses. Each regres-
sion includes regional dummies. Endogenous variables: ∆π,
∆R, ∆ζ, ∆pm and ∆τ. Additional instruments are: ∆Rt−2,
∆ζt−2, ∆pm,t−2, ∆τt−2, ∆Rt−3, ∆ζt−3, ∆pm,t−3, ∆τt−3, ∆πt−1,
∆πt−2, ∆gt−1, ∆gt−2, ∆gt−3, ∆ut−2, ut−2,w h e r eπ and g are
the national inﬂation rate and the share of public employ-
ment in the labor force respectively. The P-values of the test
of overidentifying restrictions (J test) and of the Wald test
for the regional diﬀerence in the estimated elasticity of unem-
ployment to average labor taxes within brackets. One and two
stars when the estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 10% and 5% level of conﬁdence.
14To summarize, the key ﬁnding in this section is that the long run elasticity
of unemployment to changes in the labor tax wedge is signiﬁcantly higher in
the Northern regions than in the South. Expressed in terms of the model
in Section 1, the estimated value of γ1 in the North (0.226)i sm o r et h a n
50% higher than in the South (0.147). How do we explain this result? The
natural thing to do is to look at the relationship between labor taxes and the
real (gross) wage.16
4.2 Labor Taxes and Gross Real Wages
The key parameter γ1 in (4) suggests that wage determination is important
and that one should consider whether there are signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences
in the sensitivity of real gross wages to the labor tax wedge and to regional
unemployment.
We study whether gross industrial real wages diﬀer across regions in their
sensitivity to regional labor taxes and unemployment by using data for 8
industries during the period 1980-95, by pooling regional data for each in-
dustry17 and by estimating a dynamic version of (2). We use industrial data
for two reasons: 1) sectorial bargaining is the core of the Italian bargaining
system; 2) we can distinguish regional diﬀerences into the component driven
by composition eﬀects (between sectors) and the component originated by
diﬀerences within sectors.
We report in Table 4 the estimated parameters β1 and β2, that refer to
the responsiveness of log real gross wages to the unemployment rate and
to log labor taxes respectively. For each group of regions, we compute the
average estimated β1 and β2, using as weights regional employment shares.
The table shows that there are signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences within sectors
in the long run responsiveness of real gross wages to changes in labor taxes.
This responsiveness is higher in the North in 5 sectors (Chemicals, Machin-
ery, Vehicles, Textiles and Private Services) and higher in the South in the
remaining 3 sectors (Foodstuﬀs, Building and Other Manufacturing). The
16”...the unemployment eﬀect of labor taxes depends crucially on the wage setting in-
stitutions.” (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000, p.52).
17We use a shorter period because of data availability.
15Table 4: Long Run Elasticities of Real Gross Wages to Changes in Labor
Taxes. FGLS Estimates. Dependent Variable: ∆ (w − p). Sample period:
1980 to 1995.
Sector β2 North β2 South β1 North β1 South
Chemicals .987∗∗ .959∗∗ -.544∗∗ .408
Engineering: Machinery .875∗∗ .415 -.484 -.832∗∗
Engineering: Vehicles 1.004∗∗ -.019 -.672∗∗ -.065
Foodstuﬀs .742∗∗ .853 .208 1.219∗∗
Textiles .713∗∗ .141 -.509 .023
Other Manufacturing .266 .528 -.616∗ .011
Building .457∗∗ .754∗ -2.005∗∗ -1.155∗∗
Private Services .347∗ .087 -1.056∗∗ -.589∗∗
Average .583 .339 -.873 -.469
Fixed Coeﬃcients Average .505
Notes: two stars and one star when the estimated elasticity is sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent and at the 10 percent
level of conﬁdence respectively.
average responsiveness, weighted by the relative employment share, is lower
in the South than in the North. Notice that pure sectorial composition eﬀects
explain only part of the diﬀerence between the North and the South: if we
apply to the Southern distribution of employment the elasticities found in
the Northern regions, the average elasticity is 0.505, signiﬁcantly above the
estimated value (0.339). Therefore, there is a genuine regional variation that
originates within industrial sectors.
We also ﬁnd evidence that in most sectors the semi-elasticity of industrial
gross wages to the regional unemployment rate is higher in the North than
in the South. Moreover, the average semi-elasticity is about twice as high in
the North.
We can use our estimates of γ1, β1 and β2 to derive from (4) the elasticity
of labor demand to changes in the real gross regional wage, α3. It turns out
that this elasticity is equal to 0.586 in the North and to 0.544 in the South.
The estimated diﬀerence in these elasticities is small and suggests that the
regional variation in the sensitivity of unemployment to labor taxes is driven
mainly by diﬀerences in regional wage determination. Gross wages in the
16North are more responsive both to labor taxes and to regional unemployment.
While these eﬀe c t sh a v eo p p o s i t ei n ﬂuence on γ1, the former eﬀect prevails
and generates a higher sensitivity of unemployment to labor taxes.
In the next section, we ask whether the observed diﬀerences in the elastic-
ity of regional gross wages to labor taxes, β2,w h i c ha r eo n l yp a r t l ye x p l a i n e d
by ”between industries” composition eﬀects, can be accounted for by the re-
gional variation in the institutions that aﬀect wage determination.
5R e g i o n a l d i ﬀerences in wage determination
The theoretical relationship between the tax wedge and unemployment is
strictly related to wage setting. This relationship may diﬀer across indus-
trial sectors and wage bargaining may also assume diﬀerent characteristics
in geographical areas reﬂecting speciﬁc socio-politic environments. Wage de-
termination in Italy is characterized by three levels of bargaining. General
issues, including income policy, pension beneﬁts and rules of the game are
bargained at the national level and involve the government, the representa-
tives of the national association of employers and the leaders of the three
major national union federations. Collective bargaining takes place at the
sectorial level and involves the sectorial union and employer federations, with
some degree of government arbitration. At this stage the bargain is about
sectorial wage ﬂoors, that have wide coverage in the industry. The ﬁnal stage
is local bargaining, that involves a single ﬁrm and is about local wage premia
over the sectorial ﬂoor.18
While the former two levels are shared by all Italian regions, regional
diﬀerences in wage determination can occur in the ﬁnal stage because the
relative importance of wage drift, deﬁned as the wage increase negotiated at
the local level above the industrial wage, varies signiﬁcantly across regions.19
There are at least two pieces of evidence in support of this variation. First,
the percentage of employees in the industrial sector involved in local wage
settlements during the years 1995-6 was higher than 40% in the North and
18In this paper we ignore pay increases decided unilaterally by the employer (merit pay).
19See Ordine (1996) for a detailed discussion of wage drift in Italy.
17close to 15% in the South (Rossi and Sestito, 2000). Second, Corneo and
Lucifora (1997) use data from 3000 Italian establishments to estimate a probit
model of the probability that local bargaining takes place. They ﬁnd that
this probability is signiﬁcantly lower in the Southern regions. Overall, this
evidence suggests that local bargaining is more widespread in the Northern
regions than in the rest of the country.
The fact that local bargaining is more widespread in the North should
be combined with the other fact that collective bargaining at the sectorial
level has occurred for most of the sample period every 3 or 4 years. When
labor taxes increase between rounds of collective bargains, as in the sample
period considered in this paper, local bargaining gives unions the opportunity
to recontract and shift part of the additional tax burden away from net
wages. This argument suggests that the gross wage should be more sensitive
to increases in labor taxes in the regions where local bargaining is more
widespread.
A potential argument going in the opposite direction is that regional
wages in the South are closer to the wage negotiated at the sectorial level
(tariﬀ wage). Since this wage imposes a sort of minimum wage across the
board, there is less room for downward adjustment of net real wages. There-
fore, the gross real wage should be more sensitive to increases in labor taxes
in the South. This argument goes through when collective bargaining set
minimum wages net of taxes. This is not the case of Italy, however, where
the tariﬀ wage (salario minimo contrattuale) is set gross of income taxes.20
While local bargaining generates local wages as markups of the tariﬀ
wage, the hidden economy can be conceived of as an informal local bargain-
ing arrangement that marks these wages down with respect to sectorial wage
settlements. An informal or hidden labor market operating side by side to
the regular labor market is a typical feature of the Italian labor market.
Importantly, the estimated share of informal employment over total employ-
ment is signiﬁcantly higher in Southern Italy. According to recent estimates
produced by ISTAT (1998), during the years 1985-1995 this share was on
average equal to 33.8% in Southern regions, almost twice as much as the
20We are grateful to Michele Salvati for having suggested this point.
18share in the Northern and Central regions (17.7%). Regional diﬀerences in
the relative importance of the informal sector induce additional variation in
the sensitivity of regional gross wages to changes in labor taxes since in the
informal sector labor taxes are not paid and there is no need to adjust local
pay to tax changes.
Overall, this discussion leads us to expect that in regions where the wage
drift is more widespread there is a higher sensitivity of gross wages to labor
taxes. This view is presented more formally in the model of the wage drift
presented in Appendix A.
6 Implications and conclusions
Recent studies of the European unemployment problem have emphasized
the importance of national institutions. Yet in a number of countries the key
aspect of high and rising unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s has been
the increased regional dispersion of unemployment rates.
In this paper we have studied the relationship between average labor taxes
and unemployment in Italian regions. There are two key results. First, labor
taxes matter for unemployment. Second, and despite similar national labor
market institutions, the relationship between unemployment and labor taxes
varies signiﬁcantly in Italy across groups of regions and is stronger in the
highly industrialized North than in the less developed South. This result is
driven by the higher sensitivity of regional wages to changes in labor taxes
in the North. We have identiﬁed two sources of variation in regional labor
markets that aﬀect regional wages in the expected direction, composition
eﬀe c t sa n dt h ew a g ed r i f t .
These ﬁndings have an interesting policy implication. It is often advo-
cated that a higher decentralization of the wage bargain could help ame-
liorating the European unemployment problem. When decentralization is
obtained by adding local to central bargaining (wage drift), it can lead to an
increase in the sensitivity of gross real wages to changes in labor taxes. In
such circumstances, a tax cut becomes more eﬀective in reducing unemploy-
ment.
19Overall, our results suggest that, in order to explain regional dispersion
in the unemployment rate, perhaps the most important feature of the recent
unemployment experience in Italy (as well as in other European countries),
one needs to look within national institutions. We not only conﬁrm recent
ﬁndings that labor taxes matter for unemployment, but we also add to the
existing evidence by showing that in Italy average labor taxes seem to matter
most where unemployment is less of a problem.
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22A Taxes and regional wage determination
In this appendix we show some theoretical reasons why we expect that the
response of wage determination to taxes can be diﬀerent across regions. We
assume a two-stage wage bargaining framework. At the ﬁrst stage a tariﬀ
wage, which is a minimum wage, is set by central negotiators. The tariﬀ
wage represents a threshold value for local unions and employers second stage
bargain. We assume that bargaining is over wages only and employment is
unilaterally set by ﬁrms after wage settlements. In what follows, we focus on
the second stage bargain, the local one.
Consider a ﬁrm and a local union that bargain over the local wage by
taking the tariﬀ wage, determined at the central or industrial level, as given.










where Y is real value added, E is labor and K is capital. By operating in a
monopolistic environment àl aDixit and Stiglitz, the ﬁrm sells output along







where Pkij is the price of the ﬁrm k’s good, P is the corresponding average
















where W(1+t) is the total labor cost which includes payroll taxes t.T h el o c a l
union bargains over the local wage with the ﬁrm, by taking (9) into account.
The union cares only about the local wage and tries to maximize the distance
between this wage and the tariﬀ wage, i.e. the wage drift. Preferences are














, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, υ ≤ 1 (10)
23where WN = W(1−φ)/ ¯ P is real consumption wage net of income taxes φ,a n d
W c
j is the industrial tariﬀ wage. Notice that the parameter δ represents the







where ξ is the relative bargaining power of the union and we assume for
simplicity that the fallbacks are zero. Therefore, in the event of no settlement,
union wage gains are zero and the local wage is equal to the tariﬀ wage.
























− 1 ≤ ηkij ≤ 0 (13)











−1 =1 ( α = π,E) (14)
so that if the union bargaining power decreases, the wage mark-up disappears
and the same occurs if elasticities are very large. In this setup, changes in
the tax wedge deﬁned as τ =
 ¯ P(1 + t)

[P(1 − φ)]
−1 aﬀect the local wage,
conditional on the tariﬀ wage, because they aﬀect the elasticities.21 In the
21Following Hamermesh (1986), εE = −(1 − s) 1





subscripts and considering that W
P (1 + t)=WN P
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(1+t)






















where (1 − ρ)−1 is the elasticity of substitution.
24rest of this section, we capture this eﬀect by assuming ηkij = η(τij). Using
(12), an increase in the labor tax wedge leads to an increase in the ratio
between the local and the tariﬀ wage if
∂ηkij
∂τij < 0.
Industrial wages in each region are obtained as weighted averages of the
wages of ﬁrms belonging to the same industry. Let σij be the proportion of
ﬁrms in region i and industry j that have local bargaining. This proportion
can vary with the tax wedge when the parties have an incentive to adjust the
net real wage to changes in labor taxes that occur after the tariﬀ wage has
been set. In implicit form, this is equivalent to assuming σij = σ (τij).T h e
incentive to bargain locally is stronger when the contract length of sectorial
contract is signiﬁcant, as it happens in Italy, where contracts are negotiated
every 3 or 4 years, and the labor tax wedge can change between settlements.
With the simplifying condition that the parameters associated to local
bargaining, to the technology and to product demand do not vary among
the ﬁrms belonging to the same region and sector, and assuming further that














Therefore, in any industry and region, the sensitivity of the net real wage
to changes in the labor tax wedge depends on the sensitivity of the tariﬀ
wage, a common industry eﬀect, on the change in the proportion of ﬁrms
that bargain locally and on the sensitivity of the local wage to tax changes.
Since the latter two eﬀects can vary across regions within the same industry,
the presence of wage drift can introduce regional variation in the sensitivity
of regional wages to regional labor taxes.



























The ﬁrst element within brackets captures the eﬀect of a percentage
change in the share of ﬁrms that bargain locally; the second element mea-
sures the impact of labor taxes on the net local wage of ﬁrms that bargain
25locally. The latter eﬀect is larger the higher the share of ﬁrms with local
wage bargains.
BD a t a s o u r c e s
The data used in this paper are obtained from regional accounts and from
labor force surveys. The sample period is 1965-1995. The main sources are:
Regional accounts data:
• ISTAT, Conti economici regionali. Anni 1980-95; SVIMEZ, I conti
economici del Centro-Nord e del Mezzogiorno nel ventennio 1970-89, Il
Mulino, 1993; ISTAT, Annuario di contabilità nazionale, 1986; Union-
camere, I dati regionali 1963-1974, Franco Angeli Editore, Milano, 1976;
Tirloni, C. and Veronese, G., Banca dati regionali 1960-1991, Fon-
dazione ENI Enrico Mattei; CRENOS, Base dati per le regioni italiane
1960-1993, Cagliari 1997; Rossi, N., Sorgato, A. and Toniolo, G., I conti
economici italiani: una ricostruzione statistica 1890-1990, in Rivista di
Storia Economica, n.10, 1993.
Labor force data:
• ISTAT, Statistiche del Lavoro, vol. 26, 1986; ISTAT, Occupazione e
redditi da lavoro dipendente 1980-1994, 1995; ISTAT; Indagine sulle
forze di lavoro.
Interest rates in the main macro areas and priceof energy:
• Bank of Italy, Statistical Bulletin, several years
The Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) measures hidden em-
ployment and earnings by combining information from the labor force survey,
a household survey,with the information provided by ﬁrms, used to compile
the national accounts. As a result of this measurement eﬀort, regional gross
wages include both earnings and employment in the regular sector and an
estimate of the earnings and employment in the informal economy. This is
consistent with the new system of European national accounts ESA 1995.
26C The estimate of the regional labor tax wedge
The regional wedge is the ratio of payroll and labor income taxes over gross
wages. Payroll taxes in Italy are paid both by employers and by employees.
Social security contributions paid by employers have by far the largest share
of payroll taxes. For the period 1980 to 1995 they are directly available
from the regional accounts. For the period before 1980, we have computed
the national payroll tax rate and adjusted it on a regional basis by using the
information on payroll tax rebates (ﬁscalizzazione e sgravi degli oneri sociali)
provided by Malfatti (1994).
There are no readily available data on the regional distribution of social
security contributions paid by employees. We have assumed that the share
of these taxes on gross wages in each region be equal to the national share.
Labor income taxes have also been estimated. For the period before the ﬁscal
reform of 1974 the income tax revenue is estimated by adding up diﬀerent tax
items (imposta sulla ricchezza mobile and imposta complementare). For the
period after the tax reform, we have used tax legislation and the information
on income distribution by region provided by ISTAT, Indagine sui consumi
delle famiglie italiane, to estimate total labor tax revenue by region.
27